

**THE COUNTER TERRORISM
STRATEGY OF SIERRA LEONE**

2013

NSC Approved

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
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The Response Pillars of the Sierra Leone Counter-Terrorism Strategy



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1.0 THE THREAT OVERVIEW

Sierra Leone has not experienced any act of terrorism apart from the systematic terror tactics employed by the Revolutionary United Front and other forces in Sierra Leone during the country's armed conflict. However, due to the international nature of the threat of terrorism and the dynamics it has, national security and intelligence estimates have always assigned some amount of effort in countering the threat. Today, lessons learnt elsewhere give indicators that no country is invulnerable from terrorism and with Al-Qaeda's declaration of 'Global Jihad' in the 90s against western interests and backers everywhere, the threat to Sierra Leone could also be assessed as real.

In April 2013, Sierra Leone deployed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to combat Al-Shabaab forces within the framework of collective security and peace enforcement. Hitherto in January 2012, a local media source in Somalia indicated that Al-Shabaab forces had vowed to attack Sierra Leonean troops in Somalia if they carried out plan of deployment in Somalia. Added to this media report, Al-Shabaab is known to have issued threats of attacks against all troop contributing countries to Somalia.

Threat assessments have indicated that the Al-Shabaab threat to Sierra Leone emanate from Al-Qaeda or Hezbollah sources due to huge western interest and presence in Sierra Leone.

The existing and immediate threats from terrorism should be treated seriously especially with the growing trend of terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel region. Al-Shabaab's operations can be international in scope as manifested in Kenya and Uganda. The rising trend of radicalization on the internet and the production of lone terrorists should be viewed with caution especially with reports of westerners of Somali descent and others opting for jihad in support of the Al-Shabaab cause. The threat from radicalized youths from the west is critical as most of them carry passports of western countries making them difficult to be detected in a country like ours.

The potential of attacks from Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah sources in Sierra Leone also exists due to the availability of the organization's target interest including Israeli nationals/businesses and western nationals/ diplomatic community. The existence of extremists among the Shia Diaspora

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could provide an easy operational platform for the Hezbollah's External Security Organization (ESO).

Other West African networks, including Boko Haram, Ansar-al-Din and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in Mali and Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) could be assessed to be sources of threat to Sierra Leone due to her participation in peace missions in support of the UN, AU and ECOWAS initiatives. Intelligence assessments have highlighted the existence of operational and logistical cooperation and linkages between AQIM and affiliates in West Africa and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Based on these assessed linkages, Al-Shabaab has the opportunities to use its West African allies to stage proxy attacks on their behalf or provide the logistical hub and operational platform to stage attacks against Sierra Leone, if required.

Based on these seeming and heightened threat from terrorism, Government has developed this Counter-Terrorism Strategy and set out programmes to give effect to it. This document articulates a strategy which can be used as a tool to get things done orderly, with a calculated relationship among ends, ways and means. This national Counter-Terrorism Strategy is intended to give rise to the preparation of a National Action Plan that spells out strategic objectives to be achieved in dealing with the terrorist threat, general actions to be taken and institutions responsible for such actions. In order to put the Action Plan into operation, an Implementation Plan shall also be prepared. The Implementation Plan shall contain specific activities to be undertaken by the respective institutions in phases (short-, medium- and long-term activities). The Strategy gives an overview of the threat, identifies Sierra Leone's vulnerabilities and highlights response mechanisms using toolkits that fall within the framework of international best-practices.

2.0 THE VULNERABILITIES OF SIERRA LEONE TO TERRORISM

Emerging from conflict, Sierra Leone has been challenged by the need to develop its security architecture and other public sector institutions. Although great strides have been made, yet huge gaps exist in the security and governance mechanisms of the state that would render her vulnerable to emerging threats to security, peace and development. If Sierra Leone is to develop, it needs to maintain and sustain a tranquil environment germane to attracting foreign direct investment and domestic growth and the implementation of the Agenda for Property. In the area of combating terrorism therefore, the following are critical areas that limit our capabilities in combating the threat:

2.1 Limited Capacity, Poor Institutional Cooperation and Coordination

Although efforts have been made to strengthen the public sector, the low resource inputs and the lack of training present a huge challenge. Intelligence agencies for example lack the requisite equipment for communications intercepts, mobility and other resources to conduct sustained and complex surveillance operations which are all very critical to counter terrorist operations.

The Police, Immigration and other security agencies lack adequate specialist training and equipment to embark on complex operations. The public sector is equally constrained as national data institutions, for example, do not have capacity to maintain a concise data of individuals in the country. The telecoms industry is still not effectively regulated to have a comprehensive database of subscribers which is also very critical to counter terrorism.

Added to these limitations are the huge bureaucratic bottlenecks and institutional rivalries that exist amongst agencies that are bound to cooperate with one another in furtherance of national security and state survival. Coordination mechanisms are ineffective, creating room for individual institutions to embark on activities independently and in most instances performing overlapping functions which create more chaos and confusion.

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Corruption, one of the key threats to national security, is a cancer that has permeated several state institutions. This phenomenon provides a fertile environment for terrorism and other forms of organized crimes to thrive especially where state functionaries are poorly remunerated.

2.2 Inadequate Knowledge and Awareness of the Threat

The knowledge and awareness of the threat from Al-Shabaab and would-be proxies is rudimentary and even non-existent amongst some crucial state functionaries. The Al-Shabaab threat to attack troop contributing countries has existed since AMISOM came into existence but despite several assessments, very little attention has been given to counter the threat both at the operational and strategic levels of governance. The general public also has little or no knowledge about terrorism.

2.3 Inadequate Controls in the Issuance of National Identity and Travel Documents

Intelligence reveals huge anomalies in controls for the issuance of Sierra Leone identity and travel documents. The lapses at Immigration, Births and Deaths and the National Registration Secretariat had led to the issuance of national identity and travel documents to non-Sierra Leoneans. Such lapses could be exploited by terrorists intending to infiltrate the country or change their identity for operations elsewhere.

2.4 Vulnerability of Critical National Infrastructure - CNI

A nation's critical infrastructure is often a soft target for a terrorist to attack as its impact easily affects the government and the population. Government installations and public offices in Sierra Leone lack the requisite protective security mechanisms, making them prone to hostile penetration by individuals with nefarious intentions. The International Airport in Lungi faces huge vulnerabilities due to lack of proper equipment, poor collaboration among agencies and the sheer lack of will to enforce security protocols.

2.5 Ineffective Monitoring and Recording of Data on Foreigners

The collection of data and monitoring of foreigners is a huge challenge and vulnerability in Sierra Leone. A proper data of the population including foreigners makes investigations and

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monitoring of suspected persons easy for security agencies. In Sierra Leone, the recording of information at ports of entry, hotels and guesthouses have not been effective and in some instances non-existent. This situation can be exploited by terrorists and other criminal networks to their advantage.

2.6 Porous Borders and Ineffective Border Controls

The porosity of its borders leaves Sierra Leone extremely vulnerable to various forms of exploitation from criminals. The land and maritime borders are not adequately manned due to lack of resources and capacity. Added to these deficiencies is the lack of adequate forms of data recording at manned border crossing points where most of the recordings are still manually undertaken and susceptible to flaws.

2.7 The Growing Threat from Other Forms of Organized Crime

The Terrorism-Organized Crime nexus also presents a huge challenge for Sierra Leone. West Africa has in the last decade experienced an increase in various forms of transnational organized crime. Considering the organized crime-terrorism nexus in areas such as the Sahel, the same would be replicated by any group with intentions to strike Sierra Leone. Despite measures at combating various forms of organized crime, drug trafficking for example remains a huge challenge. Drug traffickers are only interested in their profit motive and would go to any extent to achieve their goals.

2.8 Lack of an Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Delay in Adopting International Instruments

Sierra Leone is still to enact an Anti-Terrorism legislation and relies on the Criminal Procedure Act of 1965 and the Public Order Act of 1965 to cover acts of terrorism. It is important that appropriate steps are taken to develop Anti- Terrorism legislation for any future physical terrorist related action. The Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Act 2012 only deals with money laundering issues and the funding of terrorism. Further, Sierra Leone still needs to ratify and domesticate some international protocols and conventions related to terrorism and take necessary steps to effectively implement Resolution 1373.


3.0 THE RESPONSE

Terrorism is a complex and difficult phenomenon that requires a wide-ranging and comprehensive response especially with the apparent threat from Al-Shabaab. Different strands of our response mechanism should be executed by relevant parties acting in cooperation and collaboration with others in a structured and coordinated way. As the aim of this strategy is to reduce the risk of terrorism posed by Al-Shabaab and others, the state's response should guard against being uncoordinated and inept. It should bring onboard civil society and communities and ensure the protection of human rights while preventing terrorism.

The strategy will be implemented within the spirits of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, the African Union Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism, the ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy of February and Conflict Prevention Framework, all of which stress the need for sustained and inclusive partnerships with local communities and civil society actors to help prevent violent conflict and extremism.

The Response mechanism is in line with the national security architecture, making use of the established institutions and committees. At the strategic level, the National Security Council (NSC) provides the highest forum for the consideration and determination of matters relating to the security of Sierra Leone. The Counter-Terrorism Committee shall be the NSC sub-committee on matters specific to terrorism. The National Security Council Coordinating Group (NSCCG) gives pertinent advice to the NSC. At the operational level, the intelligence agencies collect intelligence on terrorism, which is pulled together by the Strategic Situation Group (SSG) to propose recommendations for government using the Instruments of National Power. The operationalisation of the intelligence is carried out at the Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre within the Transnational Organized Crime Unit (TOCU), under the auspices of the Joint Coordinating Centre (JCC).

COUNTER TERRORISM WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF SIERRA LEONE



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3.1 Guiding Principles

The principle of GoSL in implementing this Strategy is respect for good governance, human rights and international law which must be an integral part of its efforts to counter terrorism and extremism. Similarly, the drive for equality, social inclusion, community cohesion, religious tolerance and co-existence strengthens society and its resistance to terrorism.

Successful delivery of this counter-terrorism strategy depends upon mutual respect and partnerships between all parts of Government; the public, private, and voluntary sectors; and all of us as individuals and as members of communities who are likely victims of the threat.

Keeping in tune with international best-practice and being cognizant of regional instruments, the strategy is divided into four principal pillars:

- *preventing terrorism by tackling radicalization of individuals;*
- *pursuing terrorists and their sponsors;*
- *protecting the public, key national services and Government; and*
- *preparing for the consequences.*

These four pillars known as the ‘Four Ps’: PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT and PREPARE will be supported by a set of ‘Democratic Toolkits’ involving the National Security Architecture’s instruments of national power: Diplomatic, Information, Security, Economic and Civil Society (DISEC).

3.2 The Four Response Pillars

3.2.1 PREVENTION- Preventing Terrorism by Tackling Radicalization of Individuals

Prevention focuses on addressing radicalization which is a process whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalized, to the extent of resorting to violence to resolve perceived grievances. It is critical to understand that this is a key and lethal weapon of recruitment by terrorist groups and has been used to recruit many young western youths of diverse backgrounds to embark on ‘jihad’ on behalf of their recruiters.

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Thus, the deradicalisation of individuals which forms the nucleus of the prevention activities of stopping people from becoming terrorists would emphasize on:

- the identification and targeting of individuals and groups with a view to sensitizing and pacifying them
- the outreaching of groups that may not have yet been identified but are at risk of potential radicalization
- the principle of inclusiveness ensuring that everybody's and anybody's views matter by engaging Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Provincial, Chiefdom and District Security Committees (PROSECs, DISECs and CHISECs)
- the targeting of the social media
- the intensification of civic education and development of programmes to rebuff or counter terrorist messages and target marginalized and outlying communities to encourage nationalism, civic responsibilities and national cohesion at the local levels
- targeting of institutions where propagandists for violence have been active in the past and may be in the future
- ensuring that established conflict resolution mechanisms are open, transparent and trusted by people who have grievances
- the building of a wide-ranging network at national and international levels for intelligence sharing, exchange of experience and knowledge on terrorism

The PREVENT pillar therefore requires the strengthening of institutions such as the National Youth Commission, NGOs involved in youth related activities to support existing national initiatives at job creation, poverty alleviation and youth empowerment. The National Youth Commission, the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the Attitudinal and Behavioral Change, the Media, Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and other stakeholders should embark on the civic education of the youth as they are currently susceptible to the easiest forms of manipulation to violence. The current proliferation of gangs, cliques and support groups should be outlawed and the youth orientated towards more meaningful pursuits of life. These groups if not handled will fall prey to easy manipulation by extremists.

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As the current trend of terrorism is from mainly Islamist-based terrorist organizations, the Council of Imams in Sierra Leone should be engaged, supported and empowered to offer counter-narratives in their sermons challenging any ideologies that could be used by terrorists to perpetuate violence. Also the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone should be engaged to foster inter-faith dialogue, respect and understanding and peaceful coexistence. Terrorism is not about Muslims with long beards or Hijab. Respective faiths should be encouraged to show mutual respect and understanding of other faiths' values and dress styles.

Another area of action to counter radicalization is by making hostile the environment in which the extremists and those radicalizing others can operate; deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists. Such actions include criminalizing the preparation, instigation and commission of terrorist acts; other behaviors such as writing, producing, publishing, distributing materials, preaching or expressing views that foment, justify or glorify terrorism.

PREVENT also involves the reform of the criminal justice systems, prison systems and law enforcement mechanism to have respect for human rights and to prevent terrorism without breeding terrorists.

Law enforcement should also be orientated to understand cultural diversity and that people clad in specific Muslim apparel or from specific nationalities are not necessarily terrorists otherwise, we risk being perceived of promoting religious persecution which might in turn trigger unpleasant consequences.

3.2.2 PURSUE- Pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them

The PURSUE pillar focuses on reducing or mitigating the terrorist threat to Sierra Leone by disrupting terrorist actions, movements and intended operations. It will focus on gathering intelligence on the activities of terrorists. As terrorists plan and operate clandestinely, INTELLIGENCE constitutes a key weapon in mitigating the threat. Intelligence also informs policy, develop strategic estimates, project future capabilities, gives indicators, warning and general threat assessment to ensure targeted law enforcement action. A renowned analyst of

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intelligence in Counter Terrorism stated that ‘with good Intelligence, a campaign against terrorism is difficult and long and without intelligence, it is lost’.

Disruption operations will hinge on the means of collection and exploitation of information and intelligence that helps identify terrorist networks, including membership, intentions and means of operations. The work of ‘the Intelligence Community’ [Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU), The Integrated Intelligence Service (ISS) of the Sierra Leone Police, and the Forces Intelligence and Security Unit (FISU) of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces] constitutes important components of the PURSUE pillar.

PURSUE will also involve enhancing the joint-up approach of our security architecture. Intelligence on terrorist is often fragmented as terrorists make it difficult to interpret their intentions and hence make it challenging for analysts to make clear-cut assessments. There is need therefore to improve on the analysis capability of the Joint Assessment Team in the Office of National Security through counter terrorism assessment training.

PURSUE also demands the enactment of a robust and comprehensive legislation on Terrorism to provide the necessary legal instruments that enables prosecutors to successfully respond to anyone who in future participates, encourages or support terrorist acts. Efforts should be made to train members of the Law Officers Department and the Bench on this emerging crime and the necessary skills for prosecution.

Further, PURSUE requires the law enforcement and the legal framework be empowered to go after the finances of terrorists. Pursuing the finances of terrorists can unravel their activities, plans and even lead to disruption or apprehension. With a robust legislation in place against money laundering, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) should be capacitated through training and cooperation with other stakeholders to detect cash flow of terrorists and other criminal elements who aid their operations. The legal system should ensure that where required and applicable by law, persons who participate, aid or abet terrorist activities must have their assets frozen. Although current trend shows that terrorists need little finances to stage an attack, they

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require huge sums of money for compensation and motivation of their foot soldiers, training and logistics to support their activities.

The State should also have in its Anti-Terror legislation the power to proscribe organizations that espouse extremism or undermine religious harmony. Once proscribed, it becomes a criminal offence to become a member of, support or display support such organizations thus creating a hostile environment for terrorists and their supporters to exist.

At the international level, agencies should seek the assistance and experience of states that have been affected by the activities of terrorism. For the Al-Shabaab threat, the intelligence and security agencies should seek the experience of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia on the steps they have taken to combat the threat; data on members of the group and modus operandi. Information sharing at the international level with the aforementioned States and other international partners is crucial to counter the ever-expanding networks of terrorists. Relations with the Intelligence and Security Services of advanced countries should be further strengthened and expanded to include requests for expertise, logistics/equipment and training.

As this strategy is inspired by the UN Global Strategy through Resolution 1373 of 2001, the AU action Plan on Terrorism and the ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy, technical and logistical assistance of these organizations through the UNODC, GIABA, and ACSRT should be sought. At the sub-regional levels, there should be improvement on information sharing and mutual legal assistance between Governments within the spirit of existing international instruments such as the ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, the Protocol Establishing an ECOWAS Criminal Intelligence Bureau and the ECOWAS Convention on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance.

3.2.3 PROTECT – Protecting the Public, Key National Assets and Interests

Protection involves reducing the vulnerability of the public, Government and national infrastructure. The protection system encompasses border protection systems, Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), crowded places, etc. Border security ensures that terrorists and those who inspire them can be prevented or monitored when traveling to the country in order to acquire

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better intelligence about suspects and identity management. Border management should be a multi-agency and interdependent initiative that brings together various government agencies and should ensure the deployment of biometric technology at other manned crossing points.

Protection of CNIs involves physical protection of strategic national assets including water sources, airport, telecommunications, Government buildings, financial institutions, mining sites, crowded places etc. A system for the protection of CNIs should involve accurate threat assessment and risk analysis to be undertaken by the primary security forces, intelligence agencies and the private sector input.

Government should also seek training, support and equipment from international partners in order to be able to adopt and effective CNI protection systems. Protect also involves respective agencies developing training requirements and seeking necessary funding and international support. Training should include requests to international partners for technological expertise as terrorists are ahead in the technological game.

3.2.4 *PREPARE* – Preparing for the Consequences

The *PREPARE* element is concerned with ensuring that if an attack occurs, we have the systems in place to handle the consequences. The concept is built on the foundations of planning, resilience and organization across the public and private sectors of society. It is important that all organizations pull in the same direction for contingency planning.

The key foundations of consequence management are identifying the risks to the state from terrorism and assessing their impact; building the capabilities to respond to them; regularly testing the consequence management systems through simulation exercises and identifying lessons learnt from such exercise from real life situations. The expertise of international partners should be sought for counter terrorism simulation exercises.

It should be prudent to incorporate the consequence management systems into the existing National Disaster Management framework which adopts contemporary and proven principles of ‘Awareness, Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery’.

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As terrorism is a strategy by its perpetrators to instill fear, physical injuries, economic losses, psychological trauma and erosion of faith in Government, Government's response should have all the ingredients to counter these effects. The key objectives of consequence management therefore are to save lives, protect property, protect the general health and welfare and return any affected population to normalcy through necessary counseling and support.

3.3 *Democratic Toolkits*

The national security architecture of Sierra Leone has adopted the instruments of national power for response in Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms. As support to the main pillars (the 'Four Ps'), the democratic toolkits are also critical instruments we can use to address this threat.

3.3.1 Diplomatic

GoSL through the Foreign Ministry and other appropriate agencies should negotiate with other governments for support (moral, financial/logistical, technological), information/intelligence and strategy. On the diplomatic front also, GOSL will form coalition with partners to align its political and strategic approaches with those of other states.

3.3.2 Information

The counter terrorism drive requires an integrated information strategy to positively educate the public and not to inadvertently fall prey to terrorists' 'psychological propaganda trap'. Public awareness should be done by professionals to avoid creating undue abhorrence against specific segments of society due to their lifestyle or religious orientation. Threat warnings to the public should be issued when absolutely necessary.

3.3.3 Security

The Police should be trained and empowered on the skills for combatting terrorism. Police training should include knowledge of the threat, human rights and other response mechanisms.

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The Military should be trained in anti-terrorist operation to support the effort of the SLP in counter-terror operations. The Military should seek training and expertise of more experienced armies in anti-terror operations. Other supporting agencies including the ONS, CISU and the TOCU should all make contributions to the counter-terrorism efforts according to their respective mandates. The existing working synergies between them should be established reviewed and strengthening to reflect the requirements of counter-terrorism efforts which can only be successful based on cooperation and collaboration.

3.3.4 Economic

GoSL shall support the imposition of sanctions against terrorist groups and their backers whether they are individuals, groups or state entities. Foreign aid and support from friendly governments shall also be sought to support the counter terrorism efforts economically through enhancing Sierra Leone's poverty alleviation strides and human growth. Internally, revenue generation drives shall be enhanced and wastages reduce to support government expenditure on poverty alleviation and the huge financial burden connected with combating terrorism.

On the financial front, the newly established Financial Intelligence Unit shall be strengthened to monitor activities within the formal and non-formal sectors of the economy so that any financial networks that may be associated with terrorism could be traced. The Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and the Know Your Customer (KYC) principles shall be strictly followed to ensure that financial service providers collect appropriate information on individuals and business entities operating within the country. Information collected by the FIU shall be made available to relevant law enforcement to support investigations related to terrorist activities.

3.3.5 Civil Society

This shall include direction to other non-security Ministries, Departments and Agencies as well as pertinent Civil Society Organizations. Civil Society shall particularly play a significant role in the engagement of groups or communities in line with the communication strategy adopted in combating the threat of terrorism.

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4.0 ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM COMMITTEE (CTC)

Government shall create a National Counter Terrorism Committee in line with the dictates of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 and Counter Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council. The CTC should comprise key ministers responsible for security portfolios in the country as well as heads of key security sector institutions and related MDAs. The CTC shall be a strategic body responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of all counter-terrorism activities in the country ensuring the accession, ratification and domestication of relevant international protocols and conventions relating to terrorism. The CTC shall ensure that the state fulfills all international obligations relating to combating terrorism. The membership of the CTC shall comprise: *the Vice President (as Chairman), the Minister of Internal Affairs (Deputy Chairman), the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, the Minister of Information and Communication, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Inspector General of Police, Chief of Defence Staff, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, Director General of the Central Intelligence and Security Unit, the National Security Coordinator (as Secretary)*. These are mainly National Security Council members.

5.0 ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNTER-TERRORISM FUSION CENTRE

The security sector shall establish a Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre to be within the TOCU framework. The CT Fusion Centre should handle operational issues relating to terrorism. The Centre shall be a Multi-Agency structure and shall be manned by dedicated and requisite mid-senior operational staff that may under normal circumstances not be permanently stationed in the TOCU headquarters. The members of the fusion Centre shall meet periodically to deliberate on ongoing CT operational issues, task partner institutions or review ongoing assignments. In the event of imminent threat or availability of actionable intelligence thereof, members shall operate permanently in TOCU until such threat is neutralized, Members of the Fusion Centre shall be vetted to ensure that the requisite hard working and credible personnel are therein assigned.

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Funding for the Fusion Centre shall be sought from GoSL and external partners through the National Counter Terrorism Committee.

6.0 RESOURCES

GoSL shall invest required resources in combating terrorism as the threat can have devastating consequences on human lives, property, stability, investment and economic development if actualized. A budget vote shall be made each year to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFeD) through the Counter Terrorism Committee for combating terrorism.

The vote shall be designated for special operations on CT issues and shall not be prejudicial to normal operational votes of respective agencies relating to their respective institutional activities.

Terrorists targets not only local assets but international assets which more often attract the most attention from terrorist actions. Further resource from international partners shall be sought to support training and equipment for the CT Fusion Centre and its operations.

7.0 IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW OF THE STRATEGY

The respective entities required to implement this strategy shall develop their respective implementation plans to ensure that efforts are coordinated and focused. It shall be subject to periodic reviews to reflect emerging challenges and responding capabilities of the security sector and partners.